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This paper addresses the question of whether neural networks, a realistic cognitive 
model of the human information processing, can learn to backward induce in a two 
stage game with a unique subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium. The result that the 
neural networks only learn a heuristic that approximates the desired output and does 
not backward induce is in accordance with the documented difficulty of humans to 
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 1. INTRODUCTION   
 
Neural networks are widely considered to be the most plausible cognitive 
model of parallel information processing in the human mind. The psychology and 
artificial intelligence literature is full of neural network models of memory, face 
recognition, language acquisition and vision to name a few. In the fields of 
economics, finance and business most applications of neural networks have been in 
the field of forecasting, for a specific application to inflation forecasting see 
Nakamura (in press), or for a collection of papers see Smith and Jatinder (2002). This 
paper however seeks to differentiate itself from the forecasting applications of neural 
networks and instead attempts to model human learning of economic games though 
the paradigm of a neural network. This work has been pioneered by Sgroi and Zizzo 
(2002) in a paper where they examine whether a neural network can learn to play the 
unique Nash equilibria in 3X3 strategy games. This paper aims to extend this work by 
focusing on an interesting question, namely that of whether a neural network can learn 
backward induction. This is of particular interest as failures of backward induction 
reasoning in humans have been documented in many papers e.g. Binmore, McCarthy 





  The class of games studied in this paper is 2-stage, 2 player, with 2X2 strategy 
spaces in each stage and unique Nash equilibria. Each payoff is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution with support from 0 to 100. In both stages, players are faced 
with 2 strategies, with (down, right) leading to the second stage as per figure 1.  
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The neural network has the following architecture: it is single-layer feed-
forward with 10 neurons in the hidden layer (all neurons use a tanh activation 
function), uses a backpropagation algorithm with step learning and no momentum 
parameter, as this is a simple and realistic learning rule from a biological aspect. 
Training consisted of repeated presentation of 1000 different games, with batch 
learning, until the MSE of the network’s output was 0.05
1. A cross-validation data set 
or some other early stopping procedure to avoid overfitting was not used as these 
procedures are not biologically plausible or realistic
2. All testing was done on sets of 
2500 never before seen games in order to test the networks ability to generalize to out 
of sample games. The input layer consisted of 14 neurons, with each neuron inputting 
each player’s payoffs from each cell in the game matrices. The output layer consisted 
                                                 
1 Other specifications were also experimented with such as more hidden layer neurons, other steps 
sizes, more hidden layers, but the results on the test sets were not significantly different indicating the 
robustness of this approach. In the end, a step size of 1 was used as this led to more rapid convergence. 
2 Training the same neural network with minimization of cross-validation MSE instead of training 
MSE lead to the same success rates on test results, so overfitting does not seem to be a problem even 
for this simple model. of 7 neurons each one representing a cell in the payoff matrices and the desired output 
was simply a 7-tuple vector with values of one for the cells which were the NE and 
zero otherwise
3. The final choice of the network was assumed to be the one whose 
output neuron had the maximum value compared to the rest
4. Five different networks 
were trained with different initial weights, so as to emulate five different players with 
different (random) priors. 
  The networks’ performances were documented for three different test sets as 
presented in figure 2. The first test set is simply new games of the same structure as 
the ones presented during the training session. The other test sets are inspired by 
Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) separation of backward induction into rationality, 
subgame consistency and truncation consistency. The truncated test set seeks to look 
at the performance of the network when the game is truncated so that it is directly 
given the NE of the second stage game as the payoffs of g, h with i, j, k, l, m, n all set 
to zero. The last stage truncated test set is the same as the previous set except that all 
payoffs are transferred to the second stage matrix of the game (a, b, c, d, e and f are 
set to zero) allowing us to test for subgame consistency and framing effects. It will 
also give us an indication as to whether the neural network learned to solve for the NE 
of the second stage of the game, a necessary step if the network has learnt to 




                                                 
3 Note that this is a stricter prediction criterion than asking the neural network to simply play the NE 
strategy. 
4 A more realistic decision process could introduce some error in making the final decision, or 
imperfect discrimination between output signals but would not affect the qualitative results of this 
paper, only the quantitative success rates. As such the quantitative results in this paper should be 
viewed as upper bounds on performance. Table 1 highlights some of the main results from the analyses of the neural 
networks output. This data comes from the averaging of the performance of the five 
trained neural networks. The average success rate on the training set was indeed high 
at 91%, which theoretically could be improved to 100% according to the universal 
approximation theorem which guarantees that there exists a set of network weights 
that will allow the neural network to achieve perfect performance (Hornik, 
Stinchcombe et al. 1989). As expected the performance on the never seen before test 
set falls significantly recognizing the Nash equilibrium in roughly 76% of games 




Success rates (%) of predicting NE in specific cells   
          
   ab cd ef gh ij kl  mn  Average
          
Training set  96.0 88.0 83.0 91.0 90.0 95.0 92.0  91.0
Test set  85.0 65.0 70.0 81.0 79.0 75.0 76.0  76.0
Truncated game set  72.0 57.0 78.0 81.0 - - -  72.0
Last stage truncated set  - - - 92.0 72.0 74.0 56.0  73.0
 
 
As half of the work has been done by solving for the Nash equilibrium of the second 
stage, it would be reasonable to expect the performance to be better on the truncated 
game test than on the standard test set yet it is virtually the same. Despite this, specific 
choices of NE differed indicating that the network suffers from truncation 
inconsistency. Testing instead on the last stage truncated test set had no significant 
impact on average performance, although success rates for specific cells differed 
indicating that the network treats payoffs differently depending on their position in the 
game matrix, thereby violating subgame consistency. Performance is again sub-optimal indicating that the network has not learnt to solve for the NE of the last game 
and therefore has not strictly learnt to backward induce. 
  Different priors or experience do not seem to significantly affect the training 
set and the full game test success rates as the standard deviation of the success rates 
given in Table 2 is quite small. 
 
Table 2  Standard dev. of success rates in predicting NE   
  across the five neural network types       
            
   ab cd ef gh ij kl mn  Average
            
Training set  0.7 2.2 3.0 3.7 1.5 2.2  1.6  0.5
Test set  6.2 4.1 5.4 4.7 5.1 3.5  2.5  3.5
Truncated game set  23.0 21.3 20.4 7.0 --  -  5.0
Last stage truncated set  --- 3.7 15.2 7.9 11.9  7.1
 
 
However the standard deviation increases significantly with respect to predicting on 
the other sets with especially large differences in the success rates of predicting 
specific NE, although this large dispersion across types disappears when comparing 
average success rates in the last column. Hence, the different neural networks do 
exhibit some individualism as far as specific choices are concerned but their average 
performance is not very different. 
Neural networks are usually regarded as “black boxes” by their critics because 
it is difficult to extract the learning rules they have endogenously learned as 
knowledge is distributed across the weights of the neural network. This paper opts to 
attempt to peer directly inside the black box by performing sensitivity analyses that 
explore how the output of the final layer neurons varies with respect to the values of 
the input neurons, whilst holding all other inputs at some fixed value (in this case at 
their means).  Across all the sensitivity analyses performed there was one very consistent 
result. The output of a particular output neuron increases when either of the two 
inputs associated with that cell increases. For example, the output of the neuron 
associated with the cell with payoffs a,b increases when either a or b increases. This 
very simple heuristic can be quite effective for the following reason. A cell is more 
likely to be the Nash equilibrium the higher its payoffs are because this increases the 
probability that the strategies associated with that cell are best responses to 
opponents’ strategies. For example cell a,b has a higher probability of being the 
unique NE the higher a and b are. In similar spirit, the lower c,d,e and f are the higher 
the probability of a,b being the NE and this effect is also apparent from the sensitivity 
analysis although the magnitude of this effect on the output neurons is smaller and not 
consistently present. Also, such a heuristic has the advantage of working equally well 
when applied to a subset of the whole game, such as a single stage, as it does when 
applied to the whole game. This simple and reasonable heuristic gives the neural 






  This paper has shown that solving for the NE in a backward induction games 
of more than one stage is not trivial even for the processing capabilities of a neural 
network. Although perfect performance is theoretically possible it is dependent on the 
learning rule’s capability to bypass local minima in the error function and reach the 
                                                 
5 In fact, a simple heuristic that predicts NE in the cell with the maximum sum of payoffs, i.e. the cell 
that maximizes social welfare, yields a success rate of about 60%, which is also significantly different 
from chance. Such a heuristic was also able to predict roughly 60% of the neural network’s choices. global minimum, a task that cannot be expected to be achieved successfully by a 
simple learning algorithm. Despite not discovering the global minimum, the neural 
network does learn a very sensible heuristic method for finding the Nash equilibrium, 
with an out of sample success rate of roughly 76%. Moreover, this heuristic appears to 
have great portability and robustness as it is capable of working equally well in 
environments where backward induction is or is not necessary i.e. single and multiple-
stage games, and therefore is a cost and resource effective heuristic for solving many 
types of games, giving it added credence and plausibility as a cognitive model of NE 
selection in humans.  
  Concluding, the neural network does not seem to learn to backward induce as 
it exhibits imperfect performance, truncation and subgame inconsistencies, and 
implements a heuristic which does not seem to be significantly affected by the 
structure or even existence of stages in games. The preliminary results of this paper 
indicate that the use of neural networks may be an important tool in the game theory 
learning literature especially when addressing the issue of how people learn to 
generalize when faced with games of similar structure but differing payoffs from 
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